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These are interesting times for the Embodied Music Cognition (EMC) framework. Briefly
summarized, EMC relies upon the hypothesis that embodied sensorimotor engagement is essential
to both production and perception of music (Leman, 2008; Leman and Maes, 2014). This
hypothesis, while suitable for accommodating different research methods used in empirical
musicology (Godøy and Leman, 2010), may be regarded as inherently rather abstract. In the
light of recent critical accounts on the foundations of embodied approaches to cognition as such
(e.g., Goldinger et al., 2016, point out that premises like “perception is influenced by the body”
are unacceptably vague), EMC hypothesis begs for further specification. Anticipating it, Leman
and Maes (2014) suggested that the process of disambiguating what EMC hypothesis stands for,
may take two forms. Firstly, the key would be to show that “embodiment plays a core role in an
interconnected network of cognitive and emotive functions” and this network would be “further
crucial in affect processing, conceptualization, tool use, and the entire array of functions needed
to make sense of music” (Leman and Maes, 2014, p. 237). Second option, which as Leman and
Maes (2014, p. 237) suggest “narrows down the perspective in order to find empirical evidence for
a specific hypothesis,” would be to show that “the effect of action is essential to making sense of
music.” In order to constructively contribute to the development of Leman and Maes’ intuitions as
to where EMC research should go, in what follows I will consider some challenges that may be of
interests to both theoretically and empirically minded researchers.
FROM METAPHORS TO VIABLE MODELS
Leman and Maes’ (2014, p. 237) challenge of establishing the “core role” that a body plays in the
“network of cognitive and emotive functions” is as interesting as it is speculative. Consider Maes
(2016) proposal for grounding EMC in terms of dynamic systems. Maes collects empirical evidence
and radicalizes the (already vague) EMC basic principle by arguing that “music perception is a
dynamic process firmly rooted in the natural disposition of sounds and the human auditory and
motor system” (Maes, 2016, p. 1). The basic principle of EMC is “radicalized” by showing the ways
in which it is consistent with recent research on predictive coding and dynamic systems in cognitive
science. However, as researchers (e.g., Mole and Klein, 2010) convincingly argue, consistency itself
is not enough to make a case in support of a given hypothesis. The key idea behind the so-called
consistency fallacy: a given body of data cannot be stated as consistent with a particular theory (e.g.,
of EMC) just for the sake of consistency with that theory. For a body of data to provide evidence for
the theory something else is needed: the data must not only be consistent with the hypothesis, they
must also count against the contradiction of that hypothesis.
It is unclear, however, how a particular set of empirical data [e.g., neuroscientific data suggesting
that listening to music triggers the motor responses in the brain (Bangert and Altenmüller, 2003
quoted in Maes et al., 2014)] may count against the standard “brain-centered” approaches to music
cognition (for discussion, see Matyja and Schiavio, 2013). The positive proposal here would be to
focus upon establishing the basic requirements for what distinguishes the “embodied” aspects of
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musical processing from the “disembodied” ones. A possible
strategy here would be to move beyond the phenomenological
metaphors of how “body shapes musical processing,” and put
some more research effort into accommodating the physiological
(e.g., bloodflow, skin conductivity as well as biochemical and
psychoneuroimmunological responses to music, see Fancourt
et al., 2014; Hodges, 2016) aspects of how music perception
influences the actual workings of a human body.
NARROWING DOWN THE EMC
PERSPECTIVE
The research paradigm of mechanistic explanation (e.g., Craver,
2007) may provide some useful tools for the viable reconstruction
of present works on embodied (music) cognition (e.g., Matyja,
2015; Matyja and Dolega, 2015). Now, it is safe to assume
that musical perception results from operations of different
hierarchically organized levels of sub-mechanisms that constitute
a living organism. The key idea behind mechanistic explanation
lies in the identification of the parts of a mechanism (e.g., human
body) and establishing in how they interact with each other in
such a way that produces a given phenomenon in question (e.g.,
music perception). Only after discovering those mechanisms and
their internal organization and interactions between them, one
can theorize about the role functions (e.g., Craver, 2001) that
they serve for a living organism interacting with music. While
I understand that it is easier said than done, my key contention is
that the future (and explanatory force) of EMC lies in moving
beyond the metaphors and going in line with methodological
naturalism. That would require, however, showing how (step-
by-step) the phenomena that are hypothesized to be embodied
are actually constituted the workings of a body. Note that this
strategy is different from currently proposed approaches. The
issues of how empirical data relates to theory of EMC has been
recently of interests for some researchers (e.g. Schiavio, 2014;
Maes, 2016). For instance, Maes (2016, p. 2)—inspired by Mahon
and Caramazza (2008)—briefly underlines the worry regarding
the drawing of (theoretical) conclusions from available empirical
data in EMC research. However, after mentioning the worry he
goes on suggesting the need for “collecting further empirical
evidence and computational models to substantiate the role
of interaction in the embodied thesis in the domain of music
perception and performance” (Maes, 2016, p. 2). The problem is,
however, that the reference to present or future data itself is not
enough to “substantiate” the initial EMC hypothesis.
Recall the distinction between data and phenomena in
philosophy of science (Bogen and Woodward, 1988). Roughly
speaking, theories (e.g., EMC hypothesis) explain particular
phenomena. A phenomenon (e.g., body affecting musical
processing) is a repeatable type of event or product (e.g.,
it occurs when human perceive music) that is not readily
observable. Conversely, empirical data (e.g., Maes et al., 2014 for
an overview) come from individual research instances that have
complex causes (that are idiosyncratic to particular experimental
situations). Now, the crux of the matter is that data may serve
as evidence for the phenomenon, but the mere reference to
the acquired experimental data is not enough to substantiate
the EMC framework. Given the initial vagueness of the guiding
hypotheses of EMC, it is not exactly clear how any amount of
future empirical data can help to refine it. Conversely, EMC
research frameworks needs a clear hypothesis—a hypothesized
multileveled model of how the body actually influences musical
processing (and does so in a way that cannot be accounted by the
preceding “disembodied” perspectives) to begin with.
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